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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Michael S. Stocks appeals from his judgment of conviction for Lewd
Conduct with a Minor Under 16.
Statement of the Facts and Course of the Proceedings
In January 2011, A.C., who is Stocks' nine year old niece, told her parents
Stocks touched her on her "private parts." (R., p.8.)

Law enforcement officers

initiated an investigation and discovered that Stocks touched A.C.'s vagina
underneath her clothing and digitally penetrated her on numerous occasions
while he was living with AC. and her parents.

(R., pp.8-10.)

Stocks also

performed oral sex on AC. approximately five times and he touched A.C. in the
"chest" area underneath her clothing. (R., pp.9-10.) AC. told law enforcement
officers Stocks tried "to put his thing up my thing" several times and he "touched
his very private part against her very private part." (R., p.10.) Stocks admitted to
performing oral sex on AC. and repeatedly touching her vagina over the course
of several weeks. 1 (PSI, pp.4-6.)
The state charged Stocks with three counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor
Under 16. (R., pp.27-29.) Pursuant to a Non-Binding Rule 11 Plea Agreement,
Stocks pled guilty to one count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor Under 16 and the
state agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (R., pp.51-52; 5/26/11 Tr., p.1,
Ls.19-23.) The state also agreed "not to recommend any harsher sentence than

1 Stocks also admitted to molesting either a seven or 10 year old girl 10 to 20
times when he was between the ages of 15 and 17. (PSI, p.12; Psychosexual
Evaluation, p.8.)
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recommended in the Pre-Sentence Investigation." (R., pp.51-52; 5/26/11 Tr., p.1,
L.24 - p.2, L.1.)
The

presentence

investigator

recommended

that

"[a]lthough

the

Psychosexual Evaluation concludes Mr. Stocks is an appropriate candidate for
[community] supervision at this time, I feel a period of incarceration is warranted
in this case, due to the fact that Mr. Stocks is a high-moderate risk of sexual
offending in the future and because there is an additional victim in his past." (PSI,
p.15.)

The presentence investigator also recommended that the district court

retain jurisdiction. (PSI, p.15.)
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel began by stating "Stocks
admits that he has a very serious problem and he also admits that he has done
some terrible things .... " (6/30/11 Tr., p.4, L.24 - p.5, L.1.)

Defense counsel

mentioned the facts contained in the PSI, but noted "it is easy to forget that
wrapped up in these problems and - and these issues that are before the Court,
at the core is a very good person who has a deep rooted problem and someone
who needs help." (6/30/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-9.)

Defense counsel stated "I can

represent to the Court that I believe we have a very good person and he does
need help." (6/30/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-11.)
After discussing Stocks' age and criminal history, defense counsel
discussed Stocks' background and stated "I would reflect to the Court that he has
a ton of family support, as the Court is aware by reviewing the presentence
investigation, his friends and his family presented many letters showing his [sic]
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care for" Stocks. (6/30/11 Tr., p.5, Ls.11-24.) Defense counsel discussed Stocks'
background again and then addressed protection of society. (6/30/11 Tr., p.6,
Ls.1-19.) Defense counsel reviewed Stocks' conduct while he was out on bond,
mentioning "there was never an allegation that [Stocks] was any [sic] other than
where he was supposed to be" and that Stocks "has had no violations of the
Court's order of release." (6/30/11 Tr., p.6, L.20 - p.7, L.12.)
Turning next to the findings of Dr. Lindsey in the psychosexual evaluation,
defense counsel discussed the "negative disclosures" Stocks made and quoted
the recommendation of Dr. Lindsey that "[w]hile Mr. Stocks is found to be highmoderate risk of sexual offending in the future, it is my opinion that does not
require incarceration for community protection purposes at this time. As long as
aggressive probationary supervision and aggressive sex offender treatment
programing [sic] are in place for him." (6/30/11 Tr., p.7, L.21 - p.8, L.9 (internal
quotations omitted).)

Defense counsel argued that "given his success on the

ankle monitor, given Dr. Lindsey's recommendation we believe that the
community can clearly be protected by aggressive probation." (6/30/11 Tr., p.8,
Ls.9-11.)
The next argument defense counsel made addressed deterrence and
punishment. (6/30/11 Tr., p.8, Ls.12-15.) Defense counsel argued that probation
would deter Stocks and "the community as a whole" and the type of probation
recommended

by Dr.

Lindsey would serve the sentencing objective of

"punishment" because it involves "[c]lose intensive monitoring." (6/30/11 Tr., p.8,
Ls.12-16.) Defense counsel discussed the details of Dr. Lindsey's probation plan
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and argued that Stocks would also be punished for his crime by having to
register as a sex offender. (6/30/11 Tr., p.8, L.15 - p.9, L.11.)
Defense counsel addressed retribution and restitution by discussing the
letter submitted by the victim's parents:
There is not a seeking of punishment, grand punishment, there is
not a seeking of retribution, there is no request that I have seen for
any restitution in this case although that may be some time down
the road, but the victims - the victim is specifically not requesting
anything other than Mike get help and they are not here today, to
address the Court.
(6/30/11 Tr., p.9, Ls.14-24.) Defense counsel went on to discuss rehabilitation
and stated "I am not a hundred percent sure that we all wouldn't benefit from the
Retained Jurisdiction Program in some fashion. [Stocks] would as well." (6/30/11
Tr., p.10, Ls.4-9.)

Defense counsel then asked "what's the best way to get

[Stocks] back into the community" and argued that placing Stocks on probation
would be preferable to the retained jurisdiction program. (6/30/11 Tr., p.10,
Ls.10-17.)

Defense counsel concluded by recommending "a lengthy and

aggressive probation" and stated:
We believe that he'll succeed in this. My firm belief is - is that you
will never see this young man again back before you. And although
we have a recommendation and I believe that the State will be
recommending the Retained Jurisdiction Program as well to-and
we - because of the agreement - the plea agreement was is that
the State would be recommending what the - and concurring with
the pre-sentence report to retained jurisdiction. We hope that this
Court will give Mike an intermediate chance on probation before
sending him away to a correctional facility. We do believe that
Probation is punishment. I think he can be successful and I think
this is the best way of getting him back into our community.
(6/30/11 Tr., p.10, L.21 - p.11, L.7.)
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In response to the defense argument for probation, the prosecutor
addressed the issue of restitution and discussed the letters that were submitted
by various individuals on Stocks' behalf. (6/30/11 Tr., p.11, L.24 - p.12, L.22; PSI
Attachment. 2 ) The prosecutor commented "they're general letters it appears and
the pre-sentence investigator noted this-it appears that many of them are either
unaware or just chose not to mention any specifics of the case today and also
most of the letters are unsigned." (6/30/11 Tr., p.12, Ls.12-15; PSI, p.10.) The
prosecutor then quoted from portions of several of the letters that discussed
Stocks integrity and character. (6/30/11 Tr., p.13, L.4 - p.14, L.2; PSI
Attachment.) After reviewing the letters, the prosecutor stated:
As is the case, in child molestation cases, such as this that is not
[atypical] your honor. In fact it is typical that a child molester will
come to Court and have many people step up to his defense and
say it can't be Michael Stocks, not this person, I know him to be a
great person, caring kind. Unfortunately, in this case Your Honor,
as the Court knows and as Mr. Stocks has admitted in the one
count of Lewd Conduct that he has pled guilty to for manual genital
contact. There is a dark side to Mr. Stocks. A dark underbelly to
this man on the exterior with adults, young people and children [he]
puts on a facade, of being someone who is of high moral character
of great integrity. Who is then yielding too [sic] deeper-whether it
is a psychological or simply a sexual issue that he has got, Your
Honor. So let me read then a couple of quotes from the PSI to
present that other side of Mr. Stocks. And I'm going to be quoting
from the defendant's version starting on page four.
(6/30/11 Tr., p.14, Ls.2-15.)
The prosecutor discussed the facts of the case by quoting Stocks' version
of the crime from the PSI. (6/30/11 Tr., p.14, L.13 - p.16, L.8; PSI, pp.4-6.) As
the prosecutor read portions of Stocks' statements from the PSI to the district

2

59 "Character letters" were attached to the PSI. (9/9/11 Certificate of Exhibits.)
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court, the prosecutor noted that Stocks was 25 years old at the time of the crime
and AG. was nine years old. (6/30/11 Tr., p.15, Ls.5-?, 20.) After reviewing the
details of the crime as Stocks' described them, the prosecutor stated:
This is the dark side of Mr. Stocks, Your Honor, an individual cancan be student body president, can put on a facade to the people
around him of what a good person of high moral standing he is.
But if he is doing this on the side, he doesn't have good character,
he doesn't have high moral standards, he is not in tuned [sic] with
what is right and wrong in his associations with minors and he
doesn't have integrity.
(6/30/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.8-14.)
The prosecutor reviewed the psychosexual evaluation and noted that he
had some concerns about the portion of the evaluation that stated "Stocks shows
some problems with anger" and Stocks "feels that he is being unjustly treated to
some extent in the current case." (6/30/11 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-23 (internal quotations
omitted); Psychosexual Evaluation, p.5.) As stated by the prosecutor:
He feels he's being unjustly treated, Your Honor. He's concerned
that he has to be a registered sex offender for the rest of his life.
What about the rest of this victims [sic] life, what about the rest of
this little nine year old ~irls [sic] life who is best friends with her
uncle, her favorite uncle 3] and was abused and molested by him,
by his admission on repeated occasions.
(6/30/11 Tr., p.16, L.23 - p.1?, L.2.)
Next, the prosecutor read the portion of the psychosexual evaluation that
discussed Stocks' use of child pornography:
However, he preferred instead-meaning Mr. Stocks
again-However, he preferred instead looking at seven to ten year
old females who were posing nude. He denies any interest in child
pornography depicting male. He would look at child pornography

3 Stocks was AG.'s "favorite uncle." (PSI, p.3.) Stocks' described AG. as his
"favorite niece" and his "best buddy." (Psychosexual Evaluation, p.?)
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for up to one to two hours at a time and would masturbate to either
the child images or the adult images. During my interview with him
Mr. Stocks estimated that he had looked at internet child
pornography on upwards to thousands of occasions. Averaging
about three times per week, he would typically masturbate while
looking at this pornography.
(6/30/11 Tr., p.17, Ls.11-19; Psychosexual Evaluation, p.8.)
The prosecutor stated he had concerns regarding Stocks' argument for
probation based on the statement in the psychosexual evaluation that Stocks
"holds his victim responsible for the behavior because she wanted and liked the
sex play that happened." (6/30/11 Tr., p.17, L.24 - p.18, L.9; Psychosexual
Evaluation, p.6.) The prosecutor discussed Stocks' admission that he molested
A.C. "over the course of a period of six to eight weeks" and noted that although
Stocks had no prior criminal history, Stocks admitted he molested a 10 year old
girl when he was 15 years old. (6/30/11 Tr., p.18, Ls.15-20; PSI, p.12;
Psychosexual Evaluation, p.8.)
The prosecutor addressed Stocks' argument "that he would like a chance
on probation" and argued that although Stocks "had done well on release, I don't
think that's a good indicator of what he would do on probation" based on the
psychosexual evaluator's conclusion that Stocks "needs to be on an aggressive
sex offender case load" because he is at "high moderate risk to reoffend."
(6/30/11 Tr., p.18, L.21 - p.19, L.8 (internal quotations omitted); Psychosexual
Evaluation, pp.11-12.)

After discussing the objectives of sentencing, the

prosecutor stated "[b]ased upon all of that and recommendations contained in the
presentence investigation report the State is going to ask that the Court impose
an underlying sentence in its discretion and retain jurisdiction in this case with a
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recommendation for the therapeutic community" because "that would fit with Dr.
Lindsey's estimation that he needs a heavily intensely supervised aggressive sex
offender caseload." (6/30/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.S-17; Psychosexual Evaluation, p.12.)
Defense counsel responded by again referring to the letters submitted in
support of Stocks and by talking about Stocks' conduct after he was charged with
this crime. (6/30/11 Tr., p.20, Ls.7-16.)

Defense counsel referred back to the

psychosexual evaluator's recommendation and

concluded

by stating the

sentence that would "best satisfy the theories of punishment" would be giving
Stocks "a chance of probation with lengthy incarceration as the key and
impetuous and the deterrent that if he fails, even slightly, he is going to go away
for a long time." (6/30/11 Tr., p.20, L.16 - p.21, L.5.)
The district court imposed a unified sentence of 10 years with two years
fixed and declined to retain jurisdiction. (R., pp.72-74; 6/30/11 Tr., p.26, Ls.1S-20;
p.27, Ls.2-7.)

Stocks filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court's

judgment of conviction. (R., pp.7S-S0.)

S

ISSUE
Stocks states the issue on appeal as:
Did the State of Idaho breach it's [sic] plea agreement with
Mr. Stocks by its argument at the sentencing hearing?
(Appellant's brief, p.2.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Stocks failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in the
prosecutor's argument in favor of the sentencing recommendation he agreed to
make?

9

ARGUMENT
Stocks Has Failed To Show Error, Much Less Fundamental Error, In the
Prosecutor's Argument To The District Court At Sentencing
A.

Introduction
Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state agreed "not to recommend any

harsher sentence than recommended in the Pre-Sentence Investigation." (R.,
pp.51-52; 5/26/11 Tr., p.1, L.24 - p.2, L.1.)

At the sentencing hearing, the

prosecutor requested that the district court retain jurisdiction in accordance with
the presentence investigator's recommendation. (6/30/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.11-15;
PSI, p.15.)

The prosecutor also requested that the district court "impose an

underlying sentence in its discretion." (6/30/11 Tr., p.19, Ls.13-14.)

The

prosecutor addressed the letters submitted on Stocks' behalf by family and
friends, described the facts of the case by referring to the PSI and the
psychosexual evaluation, discussed the objectives of sentencing, and explained
why probation would not be appropriate based on the psychosexual evaluator's
recommendation that Stocks needs "aggressive sex offender" treatment. (6/30/11
Tr., p.12, L.7 - p.20, LA.)
For the first time on appeal, Stocks argues that the state breached the
plea agreement by "attacking the credibility of the various letter writers that
presented information in mitigation" on his behalf, by stating Stocks has a "dark
side," a "dark underbelly," and puts on a "fa9ade," by reading Stocks' description
of the offense from the PSI, and by discussing statements Stocks made to the
psychosexual evaluator. (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.) This argument fails for two
reasons.

First, Stocks did not object below, did not preserve this issue for
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appellate review, and has failed to claim fundamental error.

Second, even if

reviewed for fundamental error, Stocks has failed to show that he was prejudiced
by the alleged breach.

B.

Standard Of Review
It is well settled that plea agreements are contractual in nature. State v.

Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410, 64 P.3d 335, 336 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Fuhriman,
137 Idaho 741, 744, 52 P.3d 886, 889 (Ct. App. 2002).

As such, the

interpretation and legal effect of a clear and unambiguous plea agreement are
matters of law reviewed de novo. Doe, 138 Idaho at 41 0, 64 P.3d at 336.

C.

Stocks Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely

objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal."
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). Whether
the issue was preserved is a "threshold" inquiry. State v. Stevens, 115 Idaho 457,
459, 767 P.2d 832, 834 (Ct. App. 1989) (objections at trial on other grounds did
not preserve issue raised on appeal). Stocks did not object to the prosecutor's
argument during sentencing and thus did not preserve his claim of an improper
sentencing argument for appellate review.
An unpreserved issue may only be considered on appeal if it "constitutes
fundamental error." State v. Johnson, 149 Idaho 259, 265, 233 P.3d 190, 196
(Ct. App. 2010). In the absence of an objection "the appellate court's authority to
remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases where the error results in the
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defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth Amendment due process right
to a fair trial in a fair tribunaL" State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961,
976 (2010). Unobjected to error will not be reviewed on appeal unless (1) the
defendant demonstrates that "one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights were violated;" (2) the error is "clear or obvious" on the
record, "without the need for any additional information" including information "as
to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision;" and (3) the "defendant
must demonstrate that the error affected the defendant's substantial rights,"
generally by showing that the error "affected the outcome of the trial
proceedings."

1ft

at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Application of this three prong test

shows that Stocks has failed to show error, much less fundamental error.4
Stocks cannot satisfy the first prong of the fundamental error test because
his constitutional rights were never violated.

Stocks has completely failed to

demonstrate that any of his constitutional rights were violated because he has
not shown that the plea agreement was actually breached.
In making a sentencing recommendation pursuant to a plea agreement,
the state is bound to honor the letter of the agreement and behave consistently
with the terms of the agreement. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262

4 Stocks has not provided any analysis of the fundamental error test set forth by
the Idaho Supreme Court in Perry. Instead, Stocks has relied solely on prior
Idaho case law that held that a breach of plea agreement automatically
constitutes fundamental error that may be reviewed for the first time on appeal.
(Appellant's brief, pp.6-7.) However, that case law is no longer good law in light
of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Puckett v. United States, 556
U.S. 129, 129 S.Ct. 1423 (2009). See State v. Longest, 149 Idaho 782,241 P.3d
955 (2010) (applying the Perry fundamental error test after the decision in
Puckett.).
12

(1971); State v. Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 616-17, 903 P.2d 1305, 1313-14
(1995). The burden is on the defendant to show that the prosecutor's overall
argument disavowed or was fundamentally at odds with the position the state
was obligated to take pursuant to the plea agreement. Lankford, 127 Idaho at
617, 903 P.2d at 1314 (sentence vacated because the state's comments at
sentencing were "fundamentally at odds with the position the state was obligated
to recommend"); State v. Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 303, 77 P.3d 988, 992 (Ct. App.
2003) (sentence vacated because the prosecutor's comments "effectively
disavowed" the recommendation).

However, "[t]he prosecution's obligation to

recommend a sentence promised in a plea agreement does not carry with it the
obligation to make the recommendation enthusiastically." Jones, 139 Idaho at
302,

77

P.3d

at 991.

Consistent with

these

standards,

the

state's

recommendation may include information that is unfavorable to the defendant if
the information is relevant to the court's sentencing determination, and may
remind the court of the applicable legal standards. State v. Brooke, 134 Idaho
807, 810, 10 P.3d 756, 759 (Ct. App. 2000) (discussion of findings contained in
the presentencing psychosexual evaluation does not constitute breach of a plea
agreement); State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 40, 896 P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App.
1995) (discussion of "information relevant to the sentencing determination" and
the "objectives of sentencing" does not constitute a breach of a plea agreement.).
Stocks argues that the prosecutor breached the plea agreement at the
sentencing hearing by questioning "the credibility of the various letter writers that
presented information in mitigation" on Stocks' behalf, stating that Stocks' had a
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"dark side," a "dark underbelly," and he put on a "fagade," reading "from the
presentence

investigation,

with

excruciating

detail,"

discussing

"various

statements" Stocks made during the psychosexual evaluation, and explaining
why Stocks would not be an appropriate candidate for probation at this time.
(Appellant's brief, pp.14-15.)
A similar argument, made under similar circumstances, was rejected by
the Idaho Court of Appeals in State v. Halbesleben, 147 Idaho 161,206 P.3d 867
(Ct. App. 2009).

In that case, Halbesleben argued that "the prosecutor's

vigorous argument, taken as a whole, was inconsistent with the state's relatively
lenient recommendation ... " Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 166, 206 P.3d at 872. In
support of her argument, Halbesleben relied on "Daubs, 140 Idaho 299, 92 P.3d
549 [(Ct. App. 2004)] and State v. Wills, 140 Idaho 773, 102 P.3d 380 (Ct. App.
2004), which, in turn, cite to Jones, 139 Idaho 299, 77 P.3d 988, and State v.
Lankford, 127 Idaho 608, 903 P.2d 1305 (1995)."

19.:.

After reviewing the facts of

those cases, the Court of Appeals stated the cases were distinguishable
because:
In each of the cases cited above, the prosecutor acknowledged the
recommendation required by the plea agreement but argued
various other reasons why the district court should not accept the
recommendation and, instead, impose a more severe sentence.
Or, in the case of Lankford, the prosecutor presented additional
aggravating evidence which, at a sentencing for first degree
murder, only served to favor imposition of the death penalty or fixed
life. This was entirely inconsistent with the state's agreement to
recommend an indeterminate term of life imprisonment. In the
present case, the prosecutor made no allusion to a more severe
recommendation contained in the PSI nor gave any personal
opinion that Halbesleben's crimes merited a greater punishment
than what was recommended. The prosecutor's vigorous argument
did not undermine the sentencing recommendation but, rather,
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buttressed it against any argument from defense counsel that
Halbesleben merited even lesser sentences based on mitigating
factors. Therefore, the prosecutor did not impliedly disavow the
sentencing recommendation through her vigorous argument of the
facts of Halbesleben's crimes and, thus, did not breach the plea
agreement.
Halbesleben, 147 Idaho at 166-68, 206 P.3d at 872-874.
Stocks' reliance on Daubs, Wills, Jones, and Lankford is also misplaced. 5
(Appellant's brief, pp.8-13, 16.) None of those cases even hints that it is possible
to undermine a recommendation, and thus breach a plea agreement, merely by
talking about the facts of the case or by drawing logical inferences therefrom.
The prosecutor in this case did not present any argument to the district court that
was inconsistent with the recommendation for retained jurisdiction.

The

prosecutor's argument was directed at rebutting Stocks' request for probation
and ensuring the district court imposed an appropriate underlying sentence
based on the seriousness of the offense.
Stocks also argues that the prosecutor's "emphasis [on the nature of the
offense]

was

completely

unnecessary

recommendation." (Appellant's brief, p.14.)
rejected in Halbesleben.

for

a

retained

jurisdiction

This type of argument was also

Halbesleben argued that "even if the prosecutor's

vigorous argument served the purpose of rebutting defense counsel's argument

Stocks cites State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 64 P.3d 335 (Ct. App. 2003) in
support of his argument as well. (Appellant's brief, pp.9-10.) However, that case
adds nothing to the analysis because it only addressed the issue of whether the
state breached a plea agreement by requesting restitution after the defendant
pled guilty.
5

15

for lesser sentences, the prosecutor's argument was 'overkill.'" Halbesleben, 147
Idaho at 168, 206 P.3d at 874. Halbesleben alleged that "the argument 'far
exceeded anything even remotely necessary to ensure .,. a penitentiary
sentence given the circumstances of this case.'"

lit

The Court of Appeals

rejected the argument, stating that:
Beyond this bare assertion, Halbesleben provides no other
argument or authority for this proposition.
Furthermore, we
disagree with Halbesleben's conclusion. As stated above, defense
counsel had already indicated an intention to seek lesser
sentences. When the prosecutor began her argument, she had to
dissuade the district court from any downward deviation from the
recommended sentences in light of defense counsel's impending
argument. Her vigorous argument and description of the hard facts
of this case and their impact on the lives of Halbesleben's children
justified her later statement to the district court that lesser
sentences would depreciate the gravity of the crimes and not serve
the necessary goal of protecting society. The prosecutor even
argued this while encouraging the district court to follow the
recommendation. As noted previously, the prosecutor gave no
indication of an ulterior motive to seek harsher sentences and the
district court's discretionary decision to deviate from the
recommendation in favor of harsher penalties does not prove the
existence of one. Therefore, the prosecutor's vigorous argument
detailing the difficult facts of the case and the effect on the lives of
the children did not constitute a breach of the plea agreement.
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As was the case in Halbesleben, the prosecutor's argument detailing the
difficult facts of this case did not constitute a breach of the plea agreement. The
prosecutor had to dissuade the district court from following the psychosexual
evaluator's recommendation of probation and explain why the presentence
investigator's recommendation of retained jurisdiction was more appropriate.
The prosecutor also had to argue for an underlying sentence.

It is not

inconsistent for a prosecutor to argue for an underlying sentence after agreeing
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to recommend retained jurisdiction because "[i]t is a common practice for a trial
court to impose a rather severe underlying sentence as an incentive for the
defendant to perform well in the retained jurisdiction program and to comply with
the probation terms if the defendant is ultimately placed on probation." State v.
Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 676, 115 P.3d 764, 767 (Ct. App. 2005).

The record

shows that the state did not breach the plea agreement and Stocks has not
demonstrated that any of his constitutional rights were violated. As such, Stocks
has not satisfied the first prong of the fundamental error test.
Stocks has also failed to satisfy the second prong of the fundamental error
test. Under the second prong of the fundamental error test, the defendant must
establish not only that there was an error, but that there was an error that is
"clear or obvious" on the record, "without the need for any additional information"
including information "as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision."
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. In the context of a plea agreement,
"[u]nless the State has specifically agreed to the contrary, the prosecutor may
legitimately refer to information relevant to the sentencing determination and may
permissibly refer to the objectives of sentencing." State v. Richards, 127 Idaho
31,40, 896 P.2d 357, 366 (Ct. App. 1995).
The only agreement the state made regarding sentencing was that the
state would "not ... recommend any harsher sentence than recommended in the
Pre-Sentence Investigation." (R., pp.51-52; 5/26/11 Tr., p.1, L.24 - p.2, L.1.) The
state followed the presentence investigator's recommendation and asked the
district court to "retain jurisdiction" with a recommendation for the therapeutic
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community because it "would fit with Dr. Lindsey's estimation that [Stocks] needs
a heavily intensely supervised aggressive sex offender caseload." (6/30/11 Tr.,
p. 19, Ls. 11-17 ; PSI, p. 15.)
Stocks asks this Court to infer from the record that the state was not
arguing for an "underlying sentence" and "that the prosecutor was giving mere 'lip
service' to the retained jurisdiction recommendations." (Appellant's brief, p.16.)
However, Stocks has cited no authority, and the state is unaware of any, for the
proposition that it is "clear or obvious" error for a prosecutor to provide a
complete recitation of the facts of a case or to address the issue of the
defendant's character at a sentencing hearing after the defendant raises it as an
issue.

The very nature of Stocks' arguments regarding whether there was a

breach of the plea agreement demonstrates that there was no clear or obvious
error because Stocks is simply asking this Court to believe his assertion, made
for the first time on appeal, that the prosecutor got "cold feet" at the sentencing
hearing and was secretly requesting a prison sentence, as opposed to retained
jurisdiction and an underlying sentence. (Appellant's brief, p.16.)
All of the statements made by the prosecutor were supported by the
record and there is no evidence the prosecutor was trying to somehow
undermine his request that the district court retain jurisdiction in accordance with
the presentence investigator's recommendation.

The only specific statements

Stocks is challenging that were not contentions of fact based on the information
contained in the PSI and the psychosexual evaluation are the prosecutor's
statements that Stocks had a "dark side," a "dark underbelly," and he put on a
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"fa9ade." (Appellant's brief, p.14.) Although these are statements of opinion, they
are opinions that are not in any way inconsistent with the state's recommendation
that the district court should retain jurisdiction so that Stocks could receive the
type of aggressive sex offender treatment recommended by the psychosexual
evaluator in a secure environment.

Therefore, Stocks has failed to show

fundamental error because he has not shown that the error he claims is clear or
obvious on the record.
Finally, Stocks has made no showing that he was prejudiced by the
alleged error. Under the third prong of the fundamental error test, "the defendant
must further persuade the reviewing court that the error was not harmless; i.e.,
that there is a reasonable possibility that the error affected the outcome of the
triaL" State v. Jackson, 151 Idaho 376, _ , 256 P.3d 784, 786 (Ct. App. 2011).
When the error relates to sentencing, "the 'outcome' he must show to have been
affected is his sentence." Puckett, 556 U.S. at _ , 129 S.Ct. at 1433 n.4. "The
defendant whose plea agreement has been broken by the Government will not
always be able to show prejudice, either because he obtained the benefits
contemplated by the deal anyway (e.g., the sentence that the prosecutor
promised to request) or because he likely would not have obtained those benefits
in any event .... " !i:L. at _ , 129 S.Ct. at 1432-33.
Stocks does not claim his sentence would have been any different if the
prosecutor had discussed the facts of the case less or if the prosecutor had
made different arguments at the sentencing hearing. (See Appellant's brief,
pp.14-17.)

Stocks was advised multiple times that the district court was not
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bound by the plea agreement (5/26/11 Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, LA.; p.7, L.24 - p.8,
L.13; R., p.52) and the district court had a duty to consider the entire record at
the sentencing hearing, see State v. Wheeler, 129 Idaho 735,739, 932 P.2d 363,
367 (Ct. App. 1997) ("The findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based not
only on what has been learned during trial, but also on information gathered from
many other sources, and a trial court's duty to arrive at a sentence appropriate to
an individual defendant necessitates access to a wide range of information.").
Even assuming the prosecutor somehow breached the plea agreement by
describing "factual instances with excruciating detail, pulling the proverbial
heartstrings of the court" (Appellant's brief, pp.14-15), the extent to which the
prosecutor referred to the PSI and the psychosexual evaluation at the sentencing
hearing is irrelevant to the determination of whether there was prejudice because
the district court had already given those reports "close consideration" prior to
sentencing. (6/30/11 Tr., p.22, Ls.14-17.) There is no evidence in the record
indicating that the district court changed the sentence it was going to impose
based on any of the statements the prosecutor made. In short, Stocks has failed
to satisfy the third prong of the fundamental error test because he has failed to
show any prejudice.
Stocks has not demonstrated clear constitutional error and he has failed to
establish that he was prejudiced by the alleged breach in any way. The state's
argument at the sentencing hearing was focused on the egregiousness of
Stocks' offense - in other words, the facts of the case.

Such an argument is

entirely consistent with the sentencing recommendation of retained jurisdiction
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because the state was legally entitled to present argument regarding the
underlying sentence, which was not covered by the plea agreement. Stocks'
belief that the prosecutor's argument was too long or that it was somehow more
compelling than strictly necessary to achieve the sentence that was sought, is
without legal or factual merit.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the sentence imposed
by the district court.

DATED this 6th day of January 2012.
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